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1  Introduction
Traditionally  the  provision  of infrastructure  services  in  most  developing  countries  -as
well  as  developed  ones-  was provided  by government  owned enterprises.  However,  these
enterprises,  at least  in  developing  countries-  have proven to be fairly inefficient  and used
for political  objectives.  A  pletora  of studies  of the  relative  performances  of public  and
private enterprises done in the past thirty years find significantly superior performance by
private (and/or privatized)  enterprises,  at least with respect  to productive  efficiency  (see
for example  Megginson  and  Netter  (2001)  and Kikeri  and  Nellis  (2002)).  Explanations
differ as to why this is so.  Aside from the incentive-for-profit  reason and arguably a more
professional  know-how  in  management  and  operating procedures  and  use of appropriate
technology,  the most important  reason may be that privatization  renders  difficult and/or
costly the day-to-day intervention  in enterprise  operation by governments  and politicians,
making manipulations  less likely.  But perhaps the leading  reason behind the strategy to
bring private  sector participation  in infrastructure  has  been the  urgent  need  for  sizable
investment.  To  improve  performance  and  coverage,  most of the state owned  enterprises
urgently needed significant investments.  Given the scarcity of public funds for investments
and  the  competing  investment  needs  in the  social  sectors,  most  countries  have  opted
for  the  transfer  of the provision  of infrastructure  services  to the private  sector.  Private
sector  participation  can and  has been  accomplished  in  a  variety of forms,  ranging  from
management  contracts,  to concessions  and to full privatizations  with significant  success.
Practically,  at  least  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  region,  seldom  a call  to the
private sector to take over and operate on an infrastructure service has had no  takers.
The reform process to improve and extend infrastructure services has been additionally
fueled  by  the  realization  by  developing  countries  that  infrastructure  levels  and  quality
significantly  matter for  economic  growth  and poverty alleviation,  and that  their current
levels  and  quality  are  not adequate  to secure those  desired  levels  of growth.  The  belief
and  the  facts  are  that  infrastructure  services  -electricity,  water,  telecommunications,
roads,  railroads,  ports  and  airports-  are  critical  to  the operation  and  efficiency  of  a
modern economy.  They enter as critical inputs in the provision  of goods and services and
impact  significantly  in the productivity,  cost and competitiveness  of the economy.  Policy
decisions regarding  their provision have ramifications  throughout  the economy,  and poor
infrastructure  services  often limit competitiveness  in other markets.  There are  plenty of
empirical  studies illustrating the impact of infrastructure  on economic growth,  among the
more  recent  are  Canning  (1998),  Calderon,  Easterly  and  Serven  (2002),  Calderon  and
Serven  (2002).  A  1 percent  increase  in the stock  of infrastructure  can  increase  GDP by
2up to  0.20 percent.  Concerning  the stock and quality  levels of infrastructure  as of 2000
in Latin American  and Caribbean  countries,  Calderon  and Serven (2002)  show that while
it has improved  somehow  since  1980,  it is  still  deficient  and has  lost significant  ground
relative  to East  Asia and  OECD  countries.  Those  authors  show that  during  the  1980-
2000  period the Latin America infrastructure  gap relative to East Asia grew  by 40%  for
roads,  70%  for telecommunications  and  nearly  90%  for power  generation,  and that  this
widening  gap can account  for  nearly 25%  of the  GDP output gap (GDP  growth  of East
Asian economics was almost twice  as large as that of Latin American countries  over that
period).  Thus infrastructure  matters and quite significantly.  In response to this and given
the mentioned  scarcity  of public funds,  most developing  countries have  been turning to
the private sector for financing  and operation  of infrastructure  services.
Private sector  participation  has often been  accompanied  by sector restructuring  prior
to the transfer and by the implementation  of a legal and  regulatory  framework.  This was
done to protect  users from the abuse of dominant position  by the new private operators,
which  in a  number  of cases  would  be  operating  as the only  provider  as a result  of nat-
ural monopoly  conditions,  to protect  possible competitive  process  new  entrants  from  a
dominant  incumbent  operator,  and  also  to prevent  opportunistic  behavior  by  both the
government  and the operator.
Quite often, the required and necessary sectors' investments are of the "sunk" type and
highly specific,  that is, costs that  cannot easily be recouped  or salvaged if the economic
atmosphere deteriorates or if the operator were to discontinue operations.  This may tempt
governments  to behave  opportunistically,  taking regulatory  actions that expropriate  the
available quasi-rents once costs  are sunk.  Typical  scenarios are a government  (or a mayor
in  the  case  of water  concessions,  since  they  usually have  exclusive  jurisdiction)  during
a  re-election  campaign  deciding  in  a  unilateral  fashion  to  cut  tariffs  or  not  to  honor
agreed  tariff increases  to  secure  popular  support.  Another  not  uncommon  scenario,  is
a new administration  deciding  not to honor the tariffs increase  stated  in the  concession
contract  granted  by the previous  administrations.  The knowledge  of potential  investors
that  this  temptation  exists  may  discourage  investment  in  the  first  place,  unless  it  is
properly addressed,  or it might  require  an  additional  premium  (bigger tariffs,  or smaller
transfer  price)  to account  for that risk.  That possibility  is the main source of regulatory
risk,  impacting costs  of capital  and needless  to say tariff  levels  necessary to secure  that
higher cost of capital-the added regulatory risk component.  The extent of that regulatory
risk  is  not  trivial.  The estimates,  depending  clearly  on country  and sector  range,  from
2  to 6  percentage  points to be added  to the  cost of capital  (Guasch  and Spiller  (1999)).
The impact is substantial.  For example  an increase of 5  percentage points in the cost of
capital to account  for the  regulatory  risk leads to a reduction  of the offered  transfer  fee
or sale price of about 35% or equivalently it requires a compeAsatory  increase  in tariffs of
3about 20%.  For example in the water concession in the city of Buenos Aires, the regulator
granted  an  increase  on tariffs  of 3.5%  for  each percentage  point  increase  on the cost  of
capital.
However,  it is  not only  the government  that  may behave opportunistically.  Once  an
enterprise  has  been  granted  a  concession  in  an  infrastructure  sector  -and  the  bidding
competitors  are  gone-  it  may  correspondingly  be  able  to  take  actions  that  "hold  up"
the government,  for example  through  insisting on renegotiating  the  regulatory  contract
ex post, or through regulatory capture.  The extensive  informational  advantages that the
enterprise possesses over the government  (as well, likely, as over other potential operators),
and its perceived  leverage vis a vis the government  in a bilateral negotiation is a powerful
potential factor  to seek  renegotiation  of the  contract  and secure  a better deal  than the
bid one.
Finally,  there  are also "neutral"  events,  that is not induced  by either the government
or the operator,  which can significantly  affect the financial equilibrium of firms, and that
can also  be used  as an opportunity to redistribute  rents.  Typical  examples  would  be an
internal or external  macroeconomic  shock, such  as the devaluation  in Argentina in 2001,
or the one  in Brazil in 1999.  That possibility  and the fact that not clear guidelines  exist
about how to adjust the concession  contracts  in such events  adds again to the regulatory
risk.
In  all  cases,  the  effectiveness  of  the  regulatory  framework  in  protecting  operators
from  government  intervention  for  political  goals,  government  from  firms'  opportunistic
behavior,  and in  absorbing  economic  shocks, matters  significantly  in  determining  sector
performance  and the incidence of renegotiation.
Beginning in the late 1980s, developing countries, with Latin America and the Caribbean
countries taking  the lead, began  a process  of significant  reforms.'  A large component  of
those reforms  was allowing  private sector participation  in the provision  of infrastructure
services  transferring significant  parts  of the operation of utilities from government  man-
agement  and control  to that of private enterprises.  These private enterprises  were  either
existing individual  corporate  entities,  or  conglomerations/consortia,  foreign  and  domes-
tic, that were  formed to provide  these services.  There was  a variety of forms  and extent
of private  participation  in  the provision  of infrastructure  services.  Each  mode  differs
in  terms  of degree  of government  participation,  risk allocation,  investment  responsibili-
ties,  operational  requirements  and in terms of the incentive structure  for operators.  The
salient  modes  of private  sector  participation  have been  privatizations  and  concessions,
and  to a much  lesser  extent  management  contracts.  The  latter  have not proven  to  be
very effective  and have  only  been occasionally  used,  at least  in the Latin  American  and
'See  for example Sanchez and  Corona  (1993).
4Caribbean countries.  In sectors such as telecommunications,  and to some extent in elec-
tricity  generation  and  gas  (the often  pioneer  sectors),  private  sector  participation  was
accomplished  by outright privatization-divestiture,  accompanied  by structural reforms of
market  structure  and  of the regulatory  framework.  In other  cases  or sectors,  legal,  po-
litical and  constitutional  restraints  hindered  or  made very difficult  the outright  sale of
public infrastructure  utilities to private parties (who quite often were foreign companies,
making the issue politically  even more complicated).  That context  is quite often the case
for the transport (ports,  airports, roads and railroads)  and water and sewage sectors,  and
some  segments  of the  electricity  sector.  Also  in  some  context  and  countries,  where  in
principle there were no legal or constitutional impediments to full privatization,  perceived
concerns  about  the performance  of privatized  companies  led to a revisiting  of the mode
of private  sector  participation  so that  the government  would  retain some control  in the
sector.  Many countries,  therefore,  resorted  to innovative  strategies  to introduce  private
sector participation in the provision of public infrastructure services in situations in which
the state could not or did not want to transfer ownership of public assets to private agents.
Amongst the  alternatives  to outright privatization,  concessions  to the private  sector for
the rights to operate  the service  for a limited length of time have  emerged  as the salient
mode.
While  private  sector  participation  by  concession  has  often  produced  significant  im-
provements  in infrastructure  sector performance,  a number of countries are  raising some
questions about the applicability of the model.  Among them are frequent conflicts with op-
erators in complying with contract clauses, tariffs perceived to be excessive,  abandonment
of the concession  by the operator  or the taking over of the concession by the government
as a result  of claimed bankruptcy  of operator,2 discontent  with price levels  and services,
poor  attention  to users  and,  particularly,  the perceived  high  incidence  of renegotiation
of contracts  shortly  after the  award  of the  concession,  often  in detriment  of  consumer
welfare.3 In most  cases  (particularly  in the water and transport  sectors),  contracts  have
been renegotiated,  impacting sector performance  and compromising the credibility  of the
country and sector involved.  Excluding the telecommunications  sector, over forty percent
of concessions  appear  to be renegotiated,  and sixty percent of those within three years of
the award of the  concession,  when  in principle  the contract  agreement was  for a period
of  15 to  30 years  (see  Guasch  2001).  And this  recorded  high  incidence  of renegotiation
2Examples  are the highway concession program  in Mexico in the early 1990s, the water concession  in
the provinces of Tucuman and Buenos  Aires in Argentina,  and in the city of Cochabamba in Bolivia,  and
a number of (build operate transfer)  BOT concessions  in the water sector in Mexico.
3The  incidence of concessions  abandoned  and  taken over  by the government  has  been significant  in
other  countries  outside the Latin America and  Caribbean region,  such as in Indonesia,  Thailand,  China,
in East Asia,  and there have been a few cases in the Africa region,  in Senegal,  Nigeria, Kenya,  Zimbabwe
and Gambia.  Most of those abandonments  have been in the roads, water and sanitation and  in the power
sector.
5is  likely to be an underestimate,  since the process  is ongoing  and  additional  concessions
could be renegotiated  in the coming  years.  While some renegotiation is  desirable,  appro-
priate and is to be expected,  this high incidence  appears to be beyond reasonable  levels,
and raises concerns  about the validity of the model.  It might indicate  poor design or ex-
cessive opportunistic  behavior by the new operators,  or by the government,  in detriment
of the efficiency  of the process and of overall welfare.
At the theoretical  level, the procurement  and regulation  literature4 has been written
for  developed  countries  in which  the  quality of institutions  yields a level of enforcement
of contracts so high that renegotiations  can be  considered as secondary  at least as a first
approximation.  On the contrary,  for LDCs it appears  that renegotiation  is an important
phenomenon  calling  for both theoretical and empirical  analysis.
Imperfect  enforcement  leading  to  renegotiations  is  a  major  characteristic  of  LDCs
which  must  be  understood  to provide  a  useful  theoretical  framework  for  procurement
policy and regulation.  This has been emphasized by the 2001 World Development  Report
(World  Bank,  2001),  which  stresses  that  "there  is a growing  consensus  that  regulation,
particularly in poor countries,  must be designed with an appreciation of both information
asymmetries  and  difficulties of enforcement".
The literature on regulation and procurement  contracts has dealt with asymmetric in-
formation within the framework of mechanism design and complete contracts.  Then, rene-
gotiation never happens.  If the regulator cannot commit not to renegotiate  (Dewatripont
(1986)) the optimal contract  suffers from the ratchet effect, but is still renegotiation-proof
(Hart and Tirole (1988),  Laffont and Tirole (1990)).  Indeed, optimal contracting commits
to ex post inefficiencies  to mitigate the costs of information  rents.  Any limitation of com-
mitment  yields  potential  renegotiation  which  can  be  anticipated  in the initial contract;
then,  the  anticipated  outcome  of renegotiation  can  be  embedded  in  the initial contract
which becomes  renegotiation-proof,  so that no renegotiation  occurs along the equilibrium
path.  The analysis has been extended to cases where some contractual  variables require
costly  auditing  (Baron  and  Besanko  (1984),  Laffont  and  Tirole  (1993),  Khalil  (1997)).
Auditing of effort  levels or states of nature is incorporated  into the contracts  but does not
yield renegotiation.
When can we have actual renegotiations?  One way is to postulate that initial contracts
are incomplete  (Hart and Moore  (1988),  Green and Laffont  (1992), Aghion  et alii (1994),
Segal and Whinston  (2002)).  The reasons invoked  for these contractual incompletenesses
are  contractual  transaction  costs  difficult  to  pin  down,  bounded  rationality  of players
which  are rarely  explicitly  modeled  or some imperfections  of the judicial  system,  which
are  assumed  in  a rather  ad hoc  way.  Modeling  more  precisely  the  imperfections  of the
4See  Laffont and Tirole  (1993)  for a synthesis.
6judicial  system is  likely  to be  the  most promising  path in our state of knowledge.  One
simple  way is to observe that many contracts  call for ex post penalties  and to stress the
imperfection  of the enforcement  of those penalties.5
Bondt (2002)  constructs a moral hazard  model with ex post penalties  which may not
be enforced  because  of side-contracting  between judges and the contractual  party  which
must  be punished.  Anderlini et  alii  (2000)  instead consider incomplete  contracts  so that
ex post judges  who maximize social welfare may be willing to void some clauses, and this
could lead  to renegotiations.
Laffont (2000), Laffont and Meleu (2001) offer procurement  and regulation models with
adverse selection where imperfect  enforcement of penalties can be affected by expenditures
in enforcement  very much in the black box tradition of the Chicago  school.  In Section 2
of this paper,  we extend this theoretical  framework  to account  for a maximal number of
realistic  characteristics  of concession  contracts  and  for exogenous  shocks.  We  allow  for
the two main motivations  of renegotiation,  incompleteness  of contracts  calling  for Pareto
improving renegotiation  and enforcement  failures which yield rent shifting renegotiations.
This will provide us with a whole set of predictions  for the probabilities of renegotiation  of
concession contracts.  The model we develop is a model of renegotiation  initiated by firms.
Renegotiations  initiated  by governments  raise technical  issues  that we  leave for  another
paper.  In particular,  in a world where firms  have private information,  the anticipation of
opportunistic behavior  by governments  will lead to strategic behavior by firms which will
want to hide their  information  to protect  their  future  rents inducing  a complex ratchet
effect.
Then,  Section  3  examines  a data set  of  concessions  awarded  in  Latin  America  and
Caribbean  countries from  1989  to 2000 covering  the sectors  of transport  and water,  and
analyzes the renegotiation  of these  contracts.  We perform  a probit panel  analysis  which
enables us to take full advantage of the information embedded  in individual observations,
such as the age of each specific contract  or its power of incentives.  The empirical  analysis
performed provides a broad support to the predictions derived from the theoretical model.
In  the concluding  section,  we  derive  some policy implications  of our theoretical  and
empirical  work.
5The importance of enforcement  of laws was stressed by the Chicago school (see Becker (1968),  Stigler
(1970),  Becker  and Stigler  (1974),  Posner  (1972)  and Polinsky  and Shavell (2000)  for  a recent synthesis),
but has been little addressed  by modern contract theory.
72  The Model
2.1  Optimal Regulation
Consider  the  concession  of a  natural  monopoly  which,  in  addition to  a necessary sunk
investment,  or fixed cost,  F, which is common  knowledge,  has a variable cost function:
C = (A7 - e) q.  (1)
where  q is the  production  level,  /3 is an  adverse  selection  parameter  in  {,  /3}  with
v = Pr (,3 = P)  and e is  a moral hazard  variable which decreases  cost, but creates to the
manager  a disutility T (e) with  I'  > 0, I" > 0, V"' > 0.
Consumers  derive utility  S (q),  S' > 0, S"  < 0 from the consumption  of the natural
monopoly's  good.  Let p (.) be  the inverse  demand  function  and i the  transfer  from  the
regulator to the firm.  The firm's net utility writes:
U  =  i + p  (q)  q  - (/  - e)q - F  -Q  f(e).  (2)
We assume that cost is ex post observable by the regulator  as well as the price and the
quantity.  So we can make the accounting  assumption that revenues  and cost are incurred
by the regulator,  who pays  a net transfer t = t + p(q)q - (-e)q  - F. Accordingly,  the
participation  constraint  of the firm can be written:
U = t - 98 (e) = t - 'P'  (3-  c) >  0,  (3)
where  we make  use of (1) to substitute e by  6 - c, with c = Cq
To finance the transfer i, the government  must raise taxes with a price of public funds
1 +  A,  A  > 0. Hence,  consumers'  net utility is:
V = S (q)  - p  (q)  q  - (1  + A)t.  (4)
Utilitarian social welfare is then given by the sum of consumers'  surplus and the firm
utility,  here with equal  weight  of 1 for both:
=  U+V
S(q) +Ap(q)q-  (1+A)((  -3e)q+F±+11(e))  -AU.  (5)
This implies that  the government  values  the rent  of the  firm  as much as consumers'
utility, which may not be realistic when the awarded concessionaire  is a foreign firm.  The
key feature,  however,  is that the regulator  dislikes leaving  a rent to the firm, which occurs
8as long as the weight  of its rent  is  lower that  1 +  A. In subsequent  sections,  we analyze
the effects of making this weight  vary.
Under complete information,  the maximization  of social welfare  would lead to6:
S'(q*)+A(p'(q*)q*+p(q*))  =  (1+A)( 3O-e*)  (6)
@IP(e*)  =  q*  (7)
U  =  O.  (8)
We denote  q*,  e*,  U* and  U*,  ,  the complete  information  solutions  corresponding
to /3  and ,3 respectively.
Since  consumers equate  their marginal  utility to the price  (S' (q) = p),  equation  (6),
which says  that social marginal  utility equals  social marginal cost,  can  be rewritten  as a
Lerner  index formula:
p-(3--e)  A  1
p  I + Aq  r  (P)'
where q (p) is the price  elasticity of demand.  The price is then between the marginal cost
(/3  -e)  and the monopoly price pM  defined  by  Pm-pO-e)  =  1
The marginal  disutility of effort  VI  (e) is equated to its marginal social gain q,  and  no
rent is given up to the firm because  funds are socially  costly (A > 0).
Suppose  now that the regulator cannot  observe  the  effort  level  e  and does  not know
,3.  However,  he can offer  a contract to the  firm before  the latter discovers  its type  (see
Figure  1 for the timing).  Figure  1:  Timing
I  I  I  o 
The regulator  The firm  The firm  Production  Time
offers  the  accepts or not  discovers its  and transfer
regulatory  the contract  type ,3  take  place
contract
Equation  (3)  shows  that  the  observability  of cost  reduces  the  problem  to a simple
adverse selection problem.  From the Revelation  Principle, there is no loss of generality in
restricting  the analysis  to  direct revelation  mechanisms  {I(,  c) , (t,-)  } which  specify  for
each  message  ,B =  ,3 or  /3 =  ,B an  average  cost  to achieve  and  a  net  transfer  from  the
regulator.  The regulatory  contract  also  recommends  a production  level  q  (or q)  and  a
total cost C (or C), compatible  with c (or c)  (between which the firm is indifferent) which
maximize expected  social welfare.
6We make the appropriate assumptions  on S (.) so that W is strictly concave in (q, e).  For more details
and motivations  about the various assumptions,  see Laffont  and Tirole (1993).
9However,  the  direct  revelation  mechanism  must  be  truthful,  i.e.,  must  satisfy  the
incentive constraints
U  =  t--O-0  )i-T(3-Z)  (9)
U  =  t  P  -)  >t-  (F  (10)
These constraints  can be rewritten:
U  >  U+I(e)  (11)
U  >  U-(e+A/3),  (12)
where  'I)(e) =  'Ii(e) - 'I'(e-  Ai3),'-V  >0,  1)"  >0.
Since the firm  must accept  or reject the contract  before it  knows its type, its partici-
pation constraint  must be written ex ante:
VU  +  (1- i)U > 0.  (13)
Finally, the regulator's  maximization  program becomes:
maxv [S(q) +Ap (qq-(1+A)  (cq+F+''(3-c))  -ALU]
+ (1-v) [S (-) + ApA(V)  V-(1  +  A])  (-cq + F +  @  -6))-  A
s.t.  (11)  (12)  (13).
It is more transparent  to rewrite this program in terms of the variables  (q, e, U) rather
than  (q, c, U).  Let  us  also  denote  W  (q, e, /)  the  complete  information  ex  post  social
welfare for  a production  level  q and  an effort  level  e when the  efficiency  parameter  is  ,
i.e.:
W (q, e,/3) = S (q) + Ap (q) q-(1 + A) ((3-e)  q + F + I  (e)) . (14)
The regulator's  program rewrites:
max v  [W (q, e,-AU]  +  (1-  v)  [W (  - AU]
s.t.  (11)  (12)  (13).
The  regulator  makes  the  participation  constraint  binding  and,  substituting  in  the
objective  function,  maximizes  social  welfare7. For each value of /3 he  finds the complete
information  optimum.  There are many pairs of transfers that structure the rents in such
7See Laffont and  Martimort  (2002).
10a way  that the incentive constraints  are satisfied.  The main  point  to notice is that the
inefficient type P3's ex post utility is always negative.8
This negative ex post utility raises the issue of enforcement.  Indeed, once it discovers
its type 1 the  firm  would  like to  renege  on  the regulatory  contract.  In  a country  with
strong  institutions,  the  contract  is  enforced  in  both  states  of  nature  ,B and  13.  As  a
consequence,  asymmetric information does not create any transaction cost for society and
the complete information optimal  allocation is achieved despite  the setting of incomplete
information.
At the other extreme, suppose that the regulator  anticipates that he will not be able
to enforce  a negative  ex post utility level  for the firm.  Then,  he will choose a regulatory
contract  which  maximizes  expected  social  welfare  under  the incentive  constraints,  but
also the ex post participation  constraints:9
U  > O  (15)
U  > o.  (16)
The  set  of constraints  is the  same  as  if the contract  was  offered  to  the firm at the
interim  stage,  i.e.  once  the firm  knows its type.  We know that in this case the efficient
type's  incentive  constraint  (11)  and  the  inefficient  type's  participation  constraint  (24)
will  be  the binding  ones.  Substituting into the  objective  function  of the regulator  and
maximizing,  we obtain:
qff  (-SSB)  =  eB  _  4I (0SB)  (17)
qff I.SB)  =qB  =q*  (18)
U  =  b (eSB)  >  o  (19)
and the same pricing equations  as under complete  information'0.
Now,  the efficient  type captures a positive rent, and to decrease somewhat this socially
costly  rent the regulator  decreases  the effort  level  in the  case  ,B  = ,B, while the  efficient
type's effort  level is not distorted.
8This  loss is minimized  when  (11)  is binding.
9We  assume  here  that  production  is  so  valuable  that  shut-down  of the  inefficient  type  is  not  an
interesting  option.
" 0This is due to the fact that the cost function satisfies the separability  assumption C (q, h ((3, e))  which
implies the dichotomy property,  i.e.  the absence of incentive correction in the pricing formula  (see Laffont
and Tirole,  1993).2.2  Imperfect Enforcement
We want to model more precisely what happens when institutions ensure only an imperfect
enforcement  of regulatory contracts.
We will  assume that when  the firm obtains an ex post utility less than its status-quo
payoff,  it attempts  to renegotiate  its regulatory  contract'1. However,  with  a  probability
7r (x), the regulator  is able nevertheless to impose the implementation  of the agreed upon
contract.  This probability  depends on the expenses  x incurred  to finance the functioning
of an  efficient  enforcement  mechanism.  We  assume  that  7r (0)  =  0,  lim  r (x)  =  1,
7rx  >  O,  7rxx  <  O.
With probability  1 - ir (x)  the regulator  is  forced  to accept  a renegotiation.  This  is
modeled  using  the Nash  bargaining  solution  but  assuming  that  renegotiation  is  costly
(become it  takes time say).  The status quo payoffs  which  obtain if the  negotiation  fails
are determined  as follows:  the firm loses its fixed cost and gets the utility level U0 =  -F.
The regulator  obtains a status quo payoff that we denote as -H.
We make appropriate assumptions  so that the efficient  type firm never wants to renege
on its contract'2. Therefore,  costly  bargaining  takes place  under  complete  information,
only when ,3 = /3. Its outcome  solves:
max  Uo)  (  }  (20)
q  l  E  (UE+  F) (6W  (  AUE + H)
with  a in (0,1)  to model  the cost of renegotiation.
It yields  the complete information production  and effort level 4q,  E  and the rent level
UE =  W(q*,E*,)  +H  F  (21)
i.e.  the firm  and the regulator share equally the social surplus.
Anticipating  the  outcome  of the  renegotiation,  the  regulator  modifies  ex  ante  the
contract  it offers.  FRom  now on,  we  denote  by U,  and U,  the  modified  rents once  the
possibility of renegotiation  is  taken into account  by the regulator.
The  sequence  of events is  now  the following.  If the firm  discovers  to be  a bad  type
,3, with probability 7r(x)  it faces  tough enforcement  and carries out the project despite  a
"More  precisely,  we  assume  that a firm  attempts  to renegotiate  when its  ex post utility level  after
renegotiation  is higher  than  the utility  level  specified  in the  contract.  We  are  considering  values  of
parameters  where it is better  for the regulator to accept  the possibility  of renegotiation than to give up
such large rents  in the  initial contract  so that  no type of firm wants to renegotiate.
1 2See conditions  below.
12negative  utility.  With probability  1 - ?r(x),  it succeeds in forcing  a renegotiation.  More-
over, when renegotiation  happens, we  assume that with some  (small)  positive probability
P the parties fail to reach  an agreement  and the status quo payoffs  are implemented.
The resulting probabilities  are:
Pr (U = U1)  =  v
Pr (U = U1)  =  (1-v) 7r (x)
Pr (U = UE)  =  (1-v)(1-7r(x))(1-P)
Pr (U =-F)  =  (1 - v) (1 - 7r (x))  P.
We still  need the  offer of contracts  to be incentive compatible  (conditions  (11)  and
(12))  and the new ex ante participation  constraint writes13:
VU1 +  (1-  V)7r(X)Ul  +  (1-  V)(1  - 7r(X))  (1-P)U
-(1 - v)(1  -7r(x))PF  >  0.  (22)
Substituting  the  outcome  of renegotiation  into the regulator's  objective  function,  it
becomes
maxv [W (q, e,)  - AU 1] + (1 - v)7r(x) [W (q',  -AU 1]
+(1  - V)(1  - 7r(X)) (1 - P)  [6W (4-,e,3) - AuEE
+(1-  v)(1 - 7r(x))P [-HI -(1 +  A)x.  (23)
Maximizing  this objective function by making the participation constraint binding we
obtain:
qE  =  q*; eE =  e*  (24)
qE  =  4*; -E  =  (25)
(1-v)ITJ(xE)  =1  +  A  (6
(1-U)7T(X  )  =  (1 -5)  W  (-q*,  V  ,)  + P [iw q,,7  + H + AF]
The probability  of renegotiation  is given  by:
Pr (renegotiation)  =  (1 - v)(1  - 7r(xE))  (27)
where,  in the right hand side, the second term, which can be labeled  as the government's
"tolerance for renegotiation",  depends on  xE, the investment  in enforcement.
13Note that  the  choice  of the  new levels  of rent U1 and  U1,  which  is  not unique,  must  be made  in
such  a way that the efficient  type does  not want  to mimic the bad type and then renegotiate,  i.e.  s.t.
U1 > 7r (x) [U 1 +  D(e)]  + (1 -7r  (x)) (1 -P)  [U  ±+  + (1-  ir (x))  P J-Fl
13What  are the main features  of the solution above?  First,  an enforcement  mechanism
is  financed.  It  is  valuable  to  build  an  enforcement  institution  only  because  the  social
welfare obtained  by the initial contract  for ,6 =  ,3 is higher than what would result  from
renegotiation  (W (-*,e*,)  >  3W (*,  ,)),  or  because  renegotiation  may  fail.  This
enforcement  mechanism  is imperfect  and its quality is determined  by (26).  The quality of
enforcement  decreases  (and therefore  the probability of renegotiation  increases)  with the
efficiency  of ex post bargaining  6.
Note that an increase of the cost of public funds has a different effect on social welfare
W(q*,e,)  depending on  the sign of revenue  net  of cost,  i.e.,
p(q)q-  ((/3- e)q + F + i(e)).
It is increasing in A if revenues exceed  cost so that the  industry is used as a source of
public  funds.  It  is  decreasing  in A in the other  case.  So the net effect  of an increase  of
A is to decrease  enforcement  in the second case  which holds  in general  for the  water and
transportation  industries'4 that we  are considering here.'5
Second,  the power  of incentives  is not  intermediary  between those  which will  be ob-
tained  with  perfect  enforcement  (high  powered)  and  self-enforcing  contracts  (low  pow-
ered).  This  is because  any rent resulting  from ex post renegotiation  is captured  ex ante
in the contract  offered  by the regulator.
2.3  Institutional constraints
Institutional constraints  in host countries  obviously affect  the incidence  of renegotiation
in concession contracts.  In what follows,  we introduce  in different ways these institutional
dimensions in the regulatory contract, focusing specifically on politics, corruption and rule
of law.
2.3.1  Politics and State Capture
A  simple  way  to  model  the  incidence  of political  considerations  in  the  occurrence  of
renegotiations,  is  to assume that  the govermnent  is more  or less captured  by the firm's
stakeholders  and overweights  or underweights  the firm's utility in social welfarel6. Thus,
the maximization program consists of a weighted sum of consumers' surplus and the utility
"The  effect  through  PAF can be neglected  for P  small.
'5In  the  absence  of a proper  measure  of the  cost  of public  funds,  we  can  proxy  it  by  the  lack  of
institutional  quality  (associated with a more inefficient  tax system).
6See  Laffont (2000a)
14of the firm:
where  -y may  actually  be  greater  than  1.  We  simply  need  to  assume,  for  an  interior
solution to hold,  that  y < 1  +  A, so that the regulator  always  wants to minimize and not
maximize  the firm's rent.  A  value of -y  higher than  1 is thus the sign that the interests of
the firm  and the government  are more aligned,  i.e.  of a higher degree  of state capture by
the firm's stakeholders.  A value of -y  less than 1 is a sign that the government  is partially
captured by the non-stakeholders  of the firm.
Solving  the same  maximization  problem  as  before,  we get  a value of U  defined  by
equation  (21),  where at the denominator  A is replaced  by 1 +  A  - . As for xE, it is now
given by
(1-  =(  E)1  A(28)
(1-  6)W  q,)  + P [6W (T, r,P)  + H +  (1 +  A - y) F]  (8
What are the effects  of an increase in  y, i.e.  of a higher degree  of state capture  on the
probability  of renegotiation?  From  (28)  it can  be seen that it decreases  the equilibrium
level  of enforcement,  which  implies  more renegotiation.  When  -y  increases,  the  cost  of
giving up a rent decreases.  Suppose first that renegotiation  never fails (P = 0).  Then this
lower  cost of the rent has no effect  because  ex ante  contracting  enables  the regulator to
capture this rent.  However,  if,  as we  have  assumed,  politicians  do not incur  losses when
a renegotiation  fails, the level of capture  does not affect social welfare when renegotiation
fails.  As -y increases,  the cost  of the rent  (when there  is no renegotiation  or when rene-
gotiation  succeeds)  decreases.  From  the firm's  participation  constraint,  it  implies that
the  social  cost  of losing  the  sunk  cost F  when  renegotiation  fails  decreases  as  well.  It
is relatively  less  costly to provoke  renegotiation  (because the regulator  is  relatively  less
concerned by failure  of negotiation)  and therefore  the level  of enforcement  decreases.  In
a dynamic  framework,  changes  of the majority  may correspond  to shifts  in the  value  of
-y. We can expect  the  probability  of renegotiation  to be  affected  by the  results of recent
elections.
2.3.2  Rule of Law or Corruption
We come back to the definition of the function  7r (x),  assuming now that it takes the form
07r (x), where  the parameter  0 stands for the quality of the rule of law or for  the level of
non-corruption,  i.e.  of the existing  "stock"  of institutions.  This parameter  0 may also
represent  a more direct channel of political capture when regulators or politicians can  be
bribed.
15Coming back to the basic  model, equation  (26)  can now be written:
(1 - v)01r1(x E)  =  I  +A  (9
(1-t/0T1(E  =(1  -J)  W  (ir  r,  0  + P  [J W (,e,++  H +  AF]  (9
so that better rule of law or less  corruption implies more investment  in enforcement.
The direct effect of an increase in 0 is thus to decrease the probability of renegotiation,
since it decreases the relative cost of enforcing the initial contract.  Thus, we expect that
in environments  characterized  by  better rule  of law or  less  corruption there  will  be less
renegotiations.
2.4  Shocks
A simple way to introduce shocks in our framework is to suppose that the distribution of
firm's types is subject to an unanticipated  noise, so that upon a shock  e, the probabilities
of the enterprise  being good  or bad  become  {Iv ±  , 1 - v - e}.  This  can  be thought  of
as  a shortcut to model  a shock  affecting either cost  or demand  of a fraction  of the firms
and  take  into account  Pareto  improving  renegotiations  made  possible  by unanticipated
events.
The probability  or renegotiation  then  becomes:
Pr (renegotiation) =  (1 - - c) (1 - ir(xE))
which  decreases  as E increases.  This  means that  positive  shocks,  such as  an increase  in
demand or a favorable shift in relative prices of inputs or outputs,  reduces the probability
of renegotiation,  while negative  shocks  (decrease  in  demand,  cost  shock)  increases  the
probability of renegotiation.1 7
2.5  Outside Financing and Limited Liability
Consider  now  the  case  where  the  firm  is  protected  by limited  liability.  However,  the
firm owns  assets which  can be used  as collateral  if the firm  incurs  some  debt.  The sunk
investment  has to be made before  producing,  and financing  may take  two  forms.  First,
the firm must rely on bank financing but should be guaranteed  enough profit to pay back
the loan.'8 Second,  if private financing  is insufficient,  the government  may finance it.  Of
course,  any combination  of these two cases  is also possible.  Let us introduce the following
notation:
" 7Admittedly,  this is a very  particular  way of extending  the model  to account  for renegotiations  due
to unexpected  events.
18Here,  we simplify the analysis by excluding renegotiations with the bank itself.  It allows us to consider
the bank's interest rate as exogenous.
16A  denotes the firm's assets  needed for the project.
F is the necessary  additional  sunk investment.
K is the amount financed by banks' loans (K E  [0, F]), so that K = 0 implies complete
government financing, while K = F corresponds  to totally private financing.  The interest
rate on this loan is r.
As the firm  has to repay K, its utility level  is now:
U = t + p (q) q - (O-e)q -(1  + r)K - x (e) *  (30)
Moreover,  since the bank must be repaid,  the firm must have a non negative utility:19
U  >  O.
This limited liability constraint  ensures that the bank is always paid back.  To simplify
the analysis,  we thus consider that the regulator takes this constraint  into account  in his
program and does not include the bank's welfare in social welfare.  A further justification
is that the bank may be  a foreign bank with respect  to which default is not affordable.
Since the government  finances only F - K,  at the cost of public fund A, the equivalent
of (14) becomes:
W (q, e,)  S (q)  + Ap (q) q-(1  +  A)  ((3  -e)  q + F + rK +  IF  (e))  . (31)
Note that  the level  of K will  affect  the status quo  payoff of the government  in case
of renegotiation.  In what  follows,  we will assume that A < F, so that the firm  is able to
repay only a share of its debt in case of failure20. Two subcases arise.  If K < A, the bank
gets K and the government  gets the remainder  A - K that covers part of its investment
F - K, leaving  a net loss  F - A. The status quo payoffs  of the firm  and the government
are respectively:
(-A,-H-F + A).
If K > A, the bank gets only A while the government gets nothing,  so it loses F - K.
Payoffs are then:
(-A,-H-F + K).
" 9 We could  specify this limited liability constraint  on financial flows i+p(q)q  - (-  e)q -(1 +r)K > 0.
This would  introduce more  regimes to consider  in the program  of the regulator  below.
20Were we to consider the case A > F, the firm's assets would  cover the total losses  in case of renego-
tiation failure.  The  bank would  get K and  the government  F - K,and the status  quo payoffs  would be
(-F,  -H), thus being independent  of financing.
17These  two cases  can be summarized,  by hoting tihatjthe status quo payoffs  are:
(-A, -H  - F + max(K, A)).  (32)
With the  possibility  of renegotiation  and the  disagreement  point  now  given by  (32),
ex post bargaining  yields:
uE =  W  (q,  + H + F-max(K, A)-AA  (33)
TYE  ~~~~2A
So, private financing  costs more than  public financing,  but it increases  the status quo
payoff of the  regulator  and therefore  its bargaining  power  in the  renegotiation.  Accord-
ingly the outcome  of renegotiation  for the firm  decreases with K.  Similarly it decreases
(resp.  increases)  with F  if 6(1  +  A) >  1 (resp.  6(1 +  A) <  1).  Note that the outcome of
renegotiation  for the regulator  unambiguously  decreases  with F.
The program becomes then:
max v [W (q, e,  -AU 1]  +  (1-  v)7r(x)  [W (  - AU1I
+(1  - v)(1  - 7r(X))  (1  - P)  [6W (*q  *),  A  - AUE
+(1-  v)(1 -7r(x))P [-H - F + max(K, A)]  - (1 +  A)x  (34)
s.t.
vUl + (1 - v)7r(x)Ul
+(1-v)(1-7r(X))  (1-P)  U
-(1-  v)(1-  7r(x))PA  >  0  (35)
Ul  >  U,  +  ()(36)
U1 >  U, 1 - i(e-A)  (37)
U1 >  0  (38)
U1 >  O.  (39)
The binding constraints  are  the limited  liability constraint  of the bad  type  (39)  and
either the incentive constraint  of the good type  (36)  or the participation  constraint  (35).
These  two constraints  can  be summarized  by writing  (using the fact  that  U1 =  0):
UiŽmax{  (1 - v)(l -,7r(X))  [PA - (1 - P) U I}
U,  > max  4)(i¢()  ,J
Noticing  that  now  renegotiation  happens  only  if  UE  >  0,  and  assuming  that  P  is
small,  the second term in parenthesis  is negative,  so only the incentive constraint  (36)  is
18-E
binding  (Ul =  1 (e)).  Substituting  the values of Ul, U,  and  U  ,the  objective  function
becomes:
max v [W (q, e,  A  -P  (e)]  +  (1-  v)ir(x) [W (q,  )]
+(-  v)(1 - 7r(z))  (1 - P)  [6W  H(q,  F  +  max (K, A)  + AA]
+(-  v)(1  - '7r(x))P  [-H - F  + max(K, A)]  - (1 +  A)x.  (40)
The effort  and  output  levels  of the bad type  are now  distorted  because  an expected
rent  is given up to the firm:
,(eL)  = VL  A  (41)
The presence  of the term 7r  (XL)  at the denominator implies a stronger distortion than
the second best  ex post contracting  level  (qSB, ISB).
As for the level of enforcement,  it is given by:
(1  -=  LmaxK[W(q  p)  ,A)J-(l-P  (42)
What is the effect  of variations in F  and K on the probability of renegotiation?  FRom
the denominator of (42), and taking into account the presence of F and K in the expression
of W (q,  it comes that:
This first effect  is due to the combined effect that an increase of K  increases cost (and
therefore  decreases  the  gain  from  avoiding  renegotiation)  and  improves  the  regulator's
bargaining  power2l  and  therefore  decreases  the  cost  of  renegotiation;  and  for  P  small
enough,
<x0.
This second effect is also  due to the fact that an increase  F increases  cost.22 Although
it also decreases  the bargaining power of the regulator,  this cost  effect  dominates.23
21Note that if renegotiation was involving the bank it would  remain true that an increase of K which
weakens the bank's  position should  improve  the bargaining power  of the regulator.
22We  have  neglected  the fact  that xL  enters  (41)  so that there is a feedback  effect  as a decrease  of x
decreases  W (qL  eL  O)  This reinforces  the effect on x.
23This  is  true whenever  -(1  + A) [1  - (1 - P) 2]  +  1+P(-6(1 + A)  +  1)  <  0.  This  can  be rewritten
(1 + A)(1 + 5P) >  1+P,  which is  always  verified.
19There  is,  however,  an incentive  effect  of the limited  liability constraint.  Indeed,  the
expected  utility of the firm  is  now strictly positive.  Therefore,  it has  incentives to invest
to increase its expected  profit.  Suppose that  with expenses  i (v)  (i' (v)  > 0, i" (v)  > 0)
the firm increases  the  probability that  3 =  3.  The firm  chooses  its investment  level by
solving:
max  V(  (-e) +  (1-_v) (1-_7r  (XL))  ((1 -P)  U'  - PA) -i  (v).
Assuming for simplicity that it does not take into account  the impact  of its choice  on
the regulation,  we get immediately  that:  I
dv  du-E dv  . dU
sgn-y = -szgn-d
This  means  that  everything  that  decreases  (resp.  increases)  the  firm's  bargaining
power and therefore the utility from renegotiation increases  (resp.  decreases)  its incentive
for investment and therefore decreases  (resp.  increases)  the probability of renegotiation.
From the expression  of UE we  see that, through  this effect,  if F increases,  either the
probability of renegotiation  increases (case J( 1+ A) < 1) which reinforces the direct effect,
or it decreases  (case  6(1 +  A) >  1).  On the  other hand,  an increase  in  K decreases  the
probability  of renegotiation.
Overall,  more  investment unambiguously  increases  the probability  of renegotiation  if
6(1  +  A) < 1, and has an ambiguous  effect  otherwise.  More private financing  always  has
an ambiguous effect.
2.6  Regulation,  Arbitration and other Contractual Clauses
Concessions contracts sometimes contain  specific clauses meant to deal with the potential
occurrence  of renegotiations,  as  for example  the  existence  of a formal set  of arbitration
rules in case of disputes, and  minimum income  guarantees.
Arbitration  rules  are  processes  which  help  settle disputes,  thereby  making  renegoti-
ation  less  costly,  i.e.  increase  6.  We  have  seen that  a increase  in  6 decreases  xE  and
increases  the  probability  of renegotiation.  In this  case,  we  would  thus expect  the exis-
tence  of formal  arbitration  rules  (higher  6) to  increase  the  probability  of renegotiation.
On the  other hand,  the existence  of a regulatory  body or more experience  in concession
contracting at the time of award  will decrease  the probability of renegotiation  due to the
more obvious  effect of greater expertise  in contracting.
A minimum income guarantee should decrease the desirability of renegotiation  by firms
but it also decreases the incentives  for effort.
20However,  as  discussed  above,  clauses  of the concession  affecting  the  outcome  of a
potential  renegotiation  should  be  treated  as endogenous.  This endogeneity  has two  di-
mensions.  First  there  is  a  direct  self-selection  effect.  For  example,  minimum  income
guarantee  clauses  are  more  likely  to be introduced  in more  risky projects.  Second,  the
inclusion of such clauses  has a moral hazard  effect,  in that  it may affect the incentive  of
the firm to behave  efficiently  as explained  above.  This  implies a countervailing  effect  on
the probability of renegotiation.  Ultimately,  determining  the qualitative impact of such
rules requires to take into account  both effects,  and is an empirical matter.
Also,  the choice  of a price  cap  regulation  over  a cost  plus regulation  is  ambiguous
because on the one hand it creates more risk to the firm and therefore more opportunities
for renegotiation,  but on the other hand  more efficient  firms select more  easily price cap
contracts.2 4
2.7  Impact  on the Probability of Renegotiation
Table 1 summarizes the impact of key variables (institutional quality,  i.e.  rule of law/non-
corruption,  0; shock e;  degree  of state capture  -y;  efficiency  of bargaining  (arbitration)  3;
minimum income guarantee;  amount of investment  required F; share of private financing
K)  on the probability of renegotiation,  as well  as the expected  effects of some additional
variables  that we  did  not  model explicitly  (existence  of a regulatory  body which  yields
better  contract  and  a stronger  commitment  of the  government  to  not  renegotiate  and
should obviously decrease the probability of renegotiation,  price cap regulation  which has
an ambiguous effect  as  discussed  above).
Table  1:  Impact of key variables on the probability of renegotiation
Probability of renegotiation
Effect of an increase in: 
Institutional quality  19
Shock E
Political  capture r  +
Arbitration  +
Cost of public funds A  +
Investment F  + / ambiguous
Private financing K  ambiguous
Minimum income  guarantee  ambiguous
Existence  of regulatory body
Previous experience  _  _  _  _
Price cap regulation  ambiguous
24See Jeon  and Laffont  (1999).
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3.1  The Data
We use an original data set, developed by the World Bank,  which describes the character-
istics  of nearly  1,000  infrastructure  projects  awarded  in  Latin American  and  Caribbean
countries  from  1989 to 2000,  in the sectors of telecommunications,  energy, transport  and
water.  We restrict ourselves to the sectors of transport and water, both because renegoti-
ations only occur in these sectors and because of their characteristics:  first, transport and
water projects are concessions stricto sensu, as opposed to telecommunications  and energy
projects  which  in some  cases  are closer to privatizations  with transfer  of assets;  second,
they both imply in general significant  transfers from the state to the private operators2 5
Considering only concessions  for which we know whether they were renegotiated or not
as of 2000, and at what date this renegotiation took place, and restricting to the 5 countries
(Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia  and  Mexico)  where  concessions  were  granted  on  a
regular basis through the  1990s in these two sectors, we  get a sample  of 307  concessions.
Table  2  shows the distribution by countries and sectors.
Table 2:  Concessions  by country  and sector
Transport  Water  Total
Argentina  38  5  43
Brazil  36  24  60
Chile  23  2  25
Colombia  41  7  48
Mexico  80  51  131
Total  218  89  307
The database  contains detailed information about the characteristics  of these conces-
sions,  including  general  details  about  the projects  (sector,  activity,  year  of award),  the
award criteria,  size and duration of the concession, information  with respect to the insti-
tutional context and degrees of freedom of the regulator, the type of regulatory framework
put  in place  (price  cap,  rate  of return,  no regulation),  and  other details  of the  conces-
sion contract  like  arbitration clauses,  nationality of operators,  among others.  Appendix
1 presents  the  full  list  and  definitions  of variables  used  in the  analysis  below.  Table  3
summarizes the frequency of the concessions'  key characteristics  in our sample which are
represented  through dummy variables.
25See Guasch  (2001)  for a detailed description of the data.
22Table 3:  Characteristics  of the concessions
Whole  Transport  Water
Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No
Renegotiations  162  52,8%  145  47,2%  99  45,4%  119  54,6%  63  70,8%  26  29,2%
Renegotiations  initiated by firms  53  17,3%  254  82,7%  49  22,5%  169  77,5%  4  4,5%  85  95,5%
Renegotiations  initiated by Govt.  94  30,6%  213  69,4%  35  16,1%  183  83,9%  59  66,3%  30  33,7%
Renegotiations  initiated by both  15  4,9%  292  95,1%  15  6,9%  203  93,1%  0  0,0%  89  100,0%
Existence of regulatory body  180  58,6%  127  41,4%  168  77,1%  50  22,9%  12  13,5%  77  86,5%
Bidding process  272  88,6%  35  11,4%  185  84,9%  33  15,1%  87  97,8%  2  2,2%
Investment requirements  235  76,5%  72  23,5%  198  90,8%  20  9,2%  37  41,6%  52  58,4%
Private financing only  160  52,1%  147  47,9%  139  63,8%  79  36,2%  21  23,6%  68  76,4%
Price cap regulation  283  92,2%  24  7,8%  199  91,3%  19  8,7%  84  94,4%  5  5,6%
Rate of return regulation  23  7,5%  284  92,5%  19  %,7%  199  91,3%  4  4,5%  85  95,5%
Arbitration process  179  58,3%  128  41,7%  172  78,9%  46  21,1%  7  7,9%  82  92,1%
Minimum income guarantee  63  20,5%  244  79,5%  62  28,4%  156  71,6%  1  1,1%  88  98,9%
The time  structure  of the sample  is  also  important.  Table  4 presents  the  number of
outstanding concessions  by country,  from  1989 to 2000,  and table 5 shows the occurrence
of renegotiations  in  each  country  and  year,  giving  first  the  number  of  renegotiations2 6
initiated  by firms,  and second  the total number  of renegotiations  regardless  of their ini-
tiator.  In total,  162  of the 307  concessions  were  renegotiated  at some  point  during the
time period under consideration,  the bulk of renegotiations  taking place in four countries:
Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia and Mexico.  Moreover a look at table 5 reveals the apparent
importance  of economic  fluctuations  and political  shocks in  determining  renegotiations.
Indeed,  the main  peaks  coincided  with  clearly  identified  events:  in  Argentina  in  1990
(hyperinflation  and recession)  and, with a lag, after  1995 (aftermath  of the 1995  Mexican
crisis),  in Brazil in  1999 (devaluation of the real),  in Colombia in 2000  (recession)  and in
Mexico  around  1995  (Mexican  crisis).  Although  not all  shocks  have  triggered  waves  of
renegotiations,  these facts suggest the consideration of economic  and political fluctuations
as potential  determinants  of renegotiations.
Table 4:  Outstanding  concessions  by country  and by year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Argentina  1  15  4  16  29  40  52  51  50  42  41  41
Brazil  - - - - - 1  6  20  36  59  61  37
Chile  - - - 1  1  3  6  9  86  95  101  105
Colombia  - - - 1  6  18  22  29  37  42  45  43
Mexico  _  9  23  34  45  61  67  66  54  63  87  105  109
26A revision  of the contract  is  classified  as a renegotiation  when it is a substantive  revision and not a
straightforward  implementation  or adaptation of the clauses in the original  contract.
23Table 5:  Renegotiations  by country and  by year
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 Total
Argentina  0/0  12/12  2/2  1/1  0/0  0/0  1/1  3/3  10/11  3/3  0/0  0/0  32/33
Brazil  - - - - - 0/0  0/0  0/0  0/1  0/5  0/24  0/6  0/36
Chile  - - - 0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  1/1  0/0  0/0  1/1
Colombia  - - - 0/0  0/0  0/0  0/1  0/1  0/0  0/0  1/3  14/14  15/19
Mexico  0/0  0/1  0/1  1/8  0/12  1/14  2/21  0/11  1/3  0/2  0/0  0/0  5/73
Total  0/0  12/13  2/3  2/9  0/12  1/14  3/23  3/15  11/15  4/11  1/27  14/20  53/162
Renegotiations  led by firms / total of renegofiations
As for renegotiations initiated by firms, they amount to 53, of which 49 in the transport
sector  and  only  4  in  water.  Moreover,  they  concentrate  in  Argentina  and  Colombia,
while in Brazil and Mexico renegotiations  were almost always initiated by the government
or  both.  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  these  firm-led  renegotiations,  and  as  said  in  the
introduction,  we  leave  for another paper the analysis of government  led renegotiations.
We  build  a panel  sample by introducing  in  any given year  macroeconomic  variables
(GDP  growth  and  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  )  and  a political  dummy  indicating
the  occurrence  of national  elections  (presidential  or  legislative).  Lastly,  to  capture  the
influence  of  the broad  institutional  context,  we  introduce  indices  of corruption,  rule  of
law and bureaucratic  quality.  We&get  an unbalanced  rotating panel of  1267 observations,
covering  12 years  and 307  concessions.
3.2  Probit Analysis
To  take  full  advantage  of the  information  included  in  each  individual  observation,  we
then run a  probit model  using the whole  panel  described  above.  This  allows  us to take
into account  the  specific  characteristics  of  each  individual  concession  including,  on top
of general  and  regulatory  details,  particular  aspects  as the time  elapsed since  the initial
award and the previous  experience  at the time of award.  The output  of these  regressions
is in tables  6 to 8.
Table  6 shows  our  basic specification,  including  the  characteristics  of the  contracts,
the  regulatory  and  institutional  environment,  a  sector  dummy,  political  and  economic
shocks  as well as  the duration  since award  of the concession  to account  for the dynamics
of the contract.  The  existence  of  a  regulator  has  a significant  and negative  impact  on
the  probability  of  renegotiation,  as  does  better  institutional  quality,  here  represented
by  an  index  of bureaucratic  quality.  Concessions  regulated  by  price  caps  prove  more
fragile,  and so do older contracts.  Both the existence  of investment  requirements  and the
exclusivity  of private  financing  increase  the occurrence  of renegotiations.  Finally,  as  for
24shocks,  fluctuations in the macroeconomic  growth rate significantly affect the probability
of renegotiations,  i.e.  recessions  increase  it while booms  reduce  it,  and this probability
also goes  up in years following national  elections,  although this last effect is only weakly
significant.
Table 6: Random effect probit panel
Dependent variable:  Dummy variable indicating the occurrence of
renegotiation  initiated by the firm
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Existence of  -1.09*  -1.15*  -1.07*  -1.08*  -1.10*  -1.51"
regulatory body  (-5.07)  (-5.05)  (4.98)  (-5.09)  (-5.09)  (-5.82)
Price cap  0.55***  0.63***  0.58***  0.60***  0.45  0.81**
(1.68)  (1.88)  (1.75)  (1.85)  (1.25)  (2.46)
Duration since award  0.19*  0.18*  0.20*  0.20*  0.18*  0.15*
(3.97)  (358)  (4.07)  (4.03)  (3.53)  (2.72)
Investment  0.78**  0.74***  0.83**  0.60  0.79**  0.65***
requirements  (1.99)  (1.87)  (2.09)  (1.57)  (1.99)  (1.71)
Private financing  0.51**  0.40  0.48***  -0.11  0.55**  0.15
(1.90)  (1.38)  (1.80)  (-0.23)  (2.00)  (0.53)
Bureaucratic  quality  -0.35**  -0.29***  -0.36*  -0.39*  -0.32**  -0.21
(-2.54)  (-1.82)  (-2.60)  (-2.76)  (-2.19)  (-1.47)
Bidding process  -0.27
(-0.91)
Duration of contract  -0.01
(-1.00)
Arbitration process  0.73
(1.32)
Minimum income  0.16
guarantee  _  (0.67)
Corruption  o0.43*
(-3.73)
Election-I  0.29  0.30  0.28  0.27  0.29  0.40***
(1.53)  (1.59)  (1.50)  (1.44)  (1.55)  (1.95)
GDP growth-I  -0.06*  -0.06*  -0.06*  -0.06*  -0.06*  -0.07*
(-.3.38)  (-3.24)  (-3.17)  (-3.21)  (-3.36)  (-3.26)
GDP growth-2  -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.14*  -0.15*
(-6.15)  (-6.18)  (-6.06)  (-6.15)  (-6.14)  (-6.07)
Transport sector  0.75**  0.80**  0.70**  0.59  0.69***  1.05*
dummy  (2.21)  (2.32)  (2.03)  (1.53)  (1.93)  (2.94)
Number of obs.  1132  1132  1128  1100  1127  1132
Log Likelihood  -132.49  -132.08  -131.95  -130.97  -132.26  -125.21
Coefficients significant at the 1%  (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) level.
25In columns  2 to 6,  we add to this basic specification.a  number of other variables.  The
existence  of  a bidding  process  to award  the  concession  proves  not  significant  in column
2. This probably  reflect the fact that bidding induces  several potentially  opposed effects:
on the  one hand,  the  selection  of a more  efficient  operator  should make  the  concession
more robust;  on the other  hand, however,  by reducing its prospective  profits  by this ex
ante competition, it could also make it more sensible to shocks.  Finally, strategic bidding
behavior  can  also  generate  an  increase  in  further  renegotiations.  In columns  3,  4  and
5,  the duration  of the concession  contract,  the existence  of an  arbitration  process,  and
of minimum  income  guarantee  are  also  not  significant.  Finally,  in  column  6,  an  index
of corruption  shows  that  a  more  corrupt  environment  increases  renegotiations.27 Not
surprisingly,  in this  case the bureaucratic  quality index loses significance.
Several contract characteristics  (duration of the contract,  minimum income guarantee,
arbitration  process,  price cap, regulation  and the  structure  of financing)  refer to clauses
in the concession contract which are likely to be introduced  or not according  to the risk of
renegotiation  perceived  ex ante and  are thus endogenous to the type and the riskiness  of
the projects undertaken.  This highlights the need to address the broader issue of contract
endogeneity.
3.3  Addressing contract  endogeneity
The endogeneity of contracts'  clauses has two dimensions.  First, there is an ex ante self-
selection  problem,  in that  the  contracting  parties  would  select  specific  clauses,  type  of
regulation and  financing  according  to their (sometimes  unobservable)  characteristics,  or
to the  characteristics  of the  project.  For example,  the inclusion  of specific  arbitration
rules could be induced by the government's  anticipation of potential renegotiations  and of
the  firm's  perceived  renegotiation  skills.  Conversely,  minimum  income  guarantee  would
be included  as a mean to make risky concessions  attractive to private  agents.  A similar
problem applies to the type of tariff regulation chosen.  A self-selection effect would suggest
that more  efficient  firms would prefer price cap regulation,  which is more risky but would
allow these firms to get higher rents, but may also lead to think that riskier projects would
be regulated by lower-powered  (cost  plus)  schemes.  Finally, the type of financing  which
prevails cannot be considered  as exogenous  either, since private operators would be more
willing  to finance projects  which  appear  as less risky and/or more profitable.
Second,  there  is  an  ex post  moral  hazard  problem  (the  effect  on  the  v  variable  in
our  model),  due to  the  fact  that  once  the contract  has  been signed,  the  firm  and  the
government  would  act  strategically  given  the  nature  of  this  contract.  Facing  shorter
27This corresponds to a negative sign of the coefficient,  due to the fact that a higher value of the index
means less corruption  (see Appendix  1).
26contracts,  firms  might  be  induced  to behave  more  efficiently  to increase  their  chance  to
be awarded the contract  again later on.  Conversely,  when protected  by minimum income
guarantee,  they  might  make  less  efforts.  Price  caps  or  private  financing  can  also  be
expected to have incentive  effects on the behavior  of firms.
The  problem  we  intend  to  tackle  is to disentangle  these two  dimensions,  in  order to
assess the real  incentive effect  of each  specific aspect of the contract.  More precisely,  we
use a two stage process aimed at controlling the self-selection effect of each of the variables
suspected  to be  endogenous.28
To  do this,  we  need  to  find  suitable  instruments.  We take  as instruments:  sectors,
corruption,  bureaucratic  quality,  rule  of law,  and  existence  of  regulatory  body,  which
are  obviously exogenous  in the sense that they are not determined  by the risk of poten-
tial renegotiations.  Nevertheless,  finding instrumental variables that would not enter the
equation explaining the probability of renegotiation  appears very difficult:'  virtually  any
contract characteristics  and any aspects of the institutional  and macroeconomic  environ-
ment  can be  argued to have  an impact  on the  probability of renegotiation.  Appendix  2
presents  the  "reduced  form"  equation,  including  only truly exogenous  variables.
The  correct  treatment  of  endogeneity  in  non  linear  probit  models  is still  an  open
question  (see  Wooldridge,  2002).  One  of the available strategy  is the  following.  We run
probit  estimates  (OLS  in the case of contracts'  duration)  of the six variables  we want  to
instrument,  using  the static  sample  of the  307 concessions.  Note that  these  first  stage
regressions  are fairly satisfactory  (see Appendix 3).  We then take the predicted  values of
each of these variables and reintroduce them in the probit panel.  Finally, we estimate the
equations with these instrumented variables.  The results are in Table 7.
28We  test  for  endogeneity,  by  running  regressions  augmented  with  the  residuals  of  the  first  stage
regressions.  Endogeneity is confirmed for the price cap, the arbitration and the minimum income variables.
29Although  the  existence of one  of these variables  not entering  the equation  explaining  renegotiation
is doubtful, identification  is still ensured by the nonlinearities of the model.
27Table 7: Random effect probit panel
Dependent variable: Dummy variable indicating the occurrence of
renegotiation initiated by the firm
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Existence of  0.41  0.03  -1.20  0.84***  1.91*
relato  body  (1.00)  (0.05)  (-1.40)  (1.87)  (2.94)
Pnce cap (IV)  8.42*  8.09*  6.57*  18.15*  13.37*
(3.97)  (3.65)  (2.90)  (4.49)  (4.77)
Duration  since  0.23*  0.23*  0.20*  0.17*  0.20*
award  (4.12)  (4.19)  (3.45)  (2.93)  (3.41)
Investment  0.86**  0.79***  0.93**  0.82**  0.77**
requirements  (2.19)  (1.96)  (2.36)  (2.06)  (1.97)
Private financing  4.56*  1.48  2.89**  3.87*  4.28*
(IV)  (3.96)  (0.66)  (2.07)  (2.99)  (3.59)
Bureaucratic quality  -0.75*  -0.85*  -0.21  -0.23  -0.23
(-3.77)  (-4.05)  (-0.65)  (-0.83)  (-0.87)
Arbitration process  3.74
(IV)  _  (1.61)  _
Minimum income  7.98**
uarantee  (IV)  (2.10)
Bidding process  -3.48*
(IV)  (-3.25)
Duration of contract  -0.13*
(IV)  (-3.15)
Election-1  0.21  0.23  0.30  0.23  0.21
(1.02)  (1.16)  (1.41)  (1.09)  (1.02)
GDP growth-I  -0.07*  -0.07*  -0.08*  -0.07*  -0.07*
(-3.18)  (-3.33)  (-3.52)  (-3.02)  (-3.15)
GDP growth-2  -0.16*  -0.16*  -0.18*  -0.20*  -0.17*
(-6.41)  (-6.50)  (-6.10)  (-6.11)  (-5.98)
Transport sector  -1.85**  -2.79*  -2.45*  -2.20*  -2.87*
(-2.43)  (-2.86)  (-2.93)  (-2.65)  (-3.35)
Numberofobs.  1132  1132  1132  1132  1132
Log Likelihood  -126.43  -125.08  -124.07  -119.60  -121.05
Note: IV in parenthesis denotes an instrumented variable.
Coefficients significant at the 1%  (*), 5%  (**) and  10% (***)  level.
The  price  cap  variable  remains  positive  and  significant  once  instrumented.  Thus,
despite  the potential  self-selection  effect,  the  higher  riskiness  of  price caps still leads  to
more  renegotiation  of the concessions under this regulatory  scheme.3 0
Concessions  financed  exclusively by the private sector are renegotiated more often and
the  effect  remains  after instrumenting  it.  Again,  on top of  the  self-selection  effect,  the
prevalence  of private  finance appears to be  linked to more renegotiations.
30It must  be noted  however  that since the instrumented variables  are dummy  variables  varying in the
range  [0,  1) (except  for  the duration of contracts),  their  predicted  values cover  a reduced  range.  This
induces  a scale effect  that explains the observed  increases in  the coefficients'  sizes  and does not  allow for
clear  inferences  on the magnitude  of the effects.  For example,  the predicted  value  corresponding  to the
price cap  variable  has a mean very close  to the actual variable  (0.92  compared to 0.94),  but  varies  only
in the range  [0.52,  1].
28The instrumented  minimum  income  guarantee  variable  is  positive and  significant  at
the  5%  level.  In  this  case,  it  seems  that,  even  taking  into  account  the  self-selection
effect  of riskier  concessions,  this kind of clause fails  to reduce  renegotiation.  This tends
to confirm  the inappropriateness  of such provision  (see  for example Engel et  alii,  2000).
The  instrumented  arbitration  process  variable  is  positive  but still not significant.  The
existence  of  a  bidding  process  now  is  negative  and  significant,  which  support  the  idea
that the  first  efficiency  argument  mentioned  above dominates.  Finally,  longer  contracts
appear  to be significantly more robust when this variable  is instrumented.
One aspect worth noticing is that in 3 out of 5 cases in table 7, the effect of the existence
of a regulator loses significance when some contract clauses are instrumented.  Technically,
this may  be related  to the fact that  this variable  is  used both in the instrumental  first-
stage  regressions  and  in  the final  specification.  Intuitively,  this  could  indicate that the
influence  of regulatory  bodies  precisely  goes  through  their  ability  in  selecting  specific
clauses  adapted  to the type and circumstances  of the concessions.
Table  8 presents various robustness  checks.
Since our model is one of renegotiations initiated by firms, we started by using firm-led
renegotiations  as our  dependent  variable.  However,  as  discussed  in  Guasch  (2001),  the
distinction according  to the renegotiations'  initiators is somewhat uncertain since a num-
ber of government-led  renegotiations  can be considered  induced by the poor performance
of the  operator.  This  is  why,  in  columns  1 and  2 we  intend to  see whether  our results
are  robust  when taking  as dependent  variable  the  dummy  variable  indicating  whether
or not there  is  a renegotiation,  whatever  the initiator.  As can be seen,  the main  differ-
ence is  the effect of the investment  and financing  variables.  The existence  of investment
requirements  loses  significance,  while  the  private  financing  variable  has  first  a negative
effect,  which  becomes positive but not significant  when instrumented.  This is not really
surprising,  since both variables  have opposite effects  on the bargaining  powers of the firm
and the government  respectively,  and so should  affect their willingness  to renegotiate  in
an opposite  way.  A more  precise  analysis  of this issue is thus left  for a future paper  on
government  led renegotiations.
Relatedly,  the fact that a renegotiation is profitable  to the firm  does not exclude that
the government could gain too.  This suggests using as dependent  variable the sum of rene-
gotiations initiated by firms and those initiated  by both parties.  The results, in columns
3  and 4,  show  very little variation  with respect  to the standard  case of Tables  6  and  7.
Although the price cap  and private financing  variables lose some significance when intro-
duced directly,  they are positive and  very significant  when  instrumented.  Other  results
remain  unchanged,  and  the  investment  and election  variables  are  even  more significant
than before.
29In columns 5 and 6, we run the regressions excluding from the sample the two countries,
Chile and Brazil, in which they were no or few firm-led renegotiations.  The general results
are  again  robust.  Furthermore,  a  similar  effect  as  in  the previous  two columns  occurs
with the  financing  variable  and again  it disappears  when  running  two-stage  regressions.
Observing  that Brazil has no firm-led  but 36 government-led  renegotiations,  this result is
probably  linked to the bargaining  power effect  discussed  before.
Table 8: Random effect probit panel
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Sample  Basic  Basic
without  wlthout
Basic  Basic  Basic  Basic  Brazil ard  Brazil and  Basic  Basic  Basic  Basic
Chile  Chile
Dependent  variable  All reneg.  All reneg.  Renego  Renego.  Reneg.  Reneg  Reneg  Reneg.  Reneg  Reneg
initiated by  initiated by  initiated by  initiated  initiated  initiated  initiated  initiated
firms  or by  firms  or by  firms  by firms  by firms  by firmfts  by firms  by firms
both  both  ____
Existence of  -1.13*  0.12  -0.85*  0.55  -1.67*  -0 43  -1.21*  0.34  -0.82**  -0.59
regulatory  body  (-6.32)  (0.36)  (-4.38)  (1.45)  (-6 42)  (-0.90)  (-5.88)  (0.83)  (-2.29)  (-1.50)
Pnce cap  0.28  0.33  0 65***  0.54  0.61***
(I  18)  (1.24)  (1.91)  (1.64)  (1.80)
Pnce cap (IV)  6 07*  7 44*  8 10*  8.22*  5.71***
(4.29)  (4.16)  (3.51)  (3.84)  (1.89)
Duration  since  0.23*  0.24*  0  15*  0.17*  0.27*  0.33*  0.20*  0 23*  0.23*  031*
award  (6 68)  (6.71)  (3.60)  (3.76)  (4.69)  (4 88)  (4 29)  (4.31)  (4 17)  (4 44)
Investment  0.06  0.20  0.72**  0.91**  1.64*  1.47*  0.62***  0.60***  1.  14*  1.06;*
requirements  (0.33)  (1.18)  (1.99)  (2.45)  (3 44)  (3.18)  (1.66)  (1.68)  (2 69)  (2.41)
Pnvate financing  -0.63*  -0 06  -0.02  0.68*  -0.25
(-4 48)  (-0.33)  (-0 07)  (2.57)  (-0.78)
Pnvate financing  1 36  343*  2.43***  4.97'  -1 48
(IV)  (1.61)  (3.40)  (1.83)  (4.61)  (-1.31)
Bureaucratic  0.44*  -0 44*  -0.39*  -0.71 *  -0 34"*  -0.44**  -0.70*  -. 1.12*
quality  (-4.62)  (-2.96)  (-3.20)  (-4.00)  (-2 33)  (-2.06)  (-5.00)  (-6.02)
Election- I  0 34*  0.20***  0 46*  041*  0.38***  0.23  0.34**  0 28  0.27  0.20
(2.85)  (I  67)  (3.02)  (2 59)  (1.83)  (I 07)  (1.97)  (1.54)  (1.21)  (0 88)
GDP growth- I  -0.06*  -0.08*  -0.04##  -0.03***  -0.08*  -0.10w  -0.06'  0 06*
(4.56)  (-5 32)  (-199)  (-1.84)  (4.22)  (4.27)  (-2.87)  (-2.75)
GDP growth-2  -0  1  -0  12*  -0. 12*  -013*  -0.13*  -0.15'  -0.13*  -0.16*
(-6.00)  (-6 32)  (-5 89)  (-6.23)  (-5.32)  (-5.58)  (-5 26)  (-5.27)
Exchange rate -I  1.47"*  1.69**
(2.27)  (2.52)
Exchange rate -2  4.60*  5.46*
(5.08)  (5 41)
Argentina dummy  7.25*  7.50**
(15.36)  (2 32)
Chile dummy  5.50  5.68***
(-)  (1.74)
Colombia dummy  6 73*  7.34'
(11.11)  (2.66)
Mexico dummy  5.72*  5.85***
(10.05)  (1.91)
Transport sector  0.38***  -1.37**  1.  19*  -1.13***  0.27  -1.36***  0.96*  -1 76"*  -0.18  -0 07
dummy  (1.79)  (-2.40)  (3.88)  (-1.66)  (0.69)  (-1.66)  (2 86)  (-2.42)  (-0.43)  (-0.09)
Number of obs.  1132  1132  1132  1132  908  908  1122  1122  1132  1132
LogiUkelihood  -314.25  31308  -188.84  -18105  -111.26  -10661  -144.92  -139.13  -109.09  -10405
Note: IV in parenthesis  denotes an instrumented variable.
Coefficients sigmficant at the 1%  (*), 5% (**) and  10% (***) level.
30Columns  7  and  8  present  the  basic  specification,  where  growth  shocks  have  been
replaced  by exchange  rate  movements.  This  kind  of shock  has also  a clear  effect,  with
lagged  measures  of exchange  rate depreciation  significantly  increasing  the probability  of
renegotiations  by firms.  The other results are unchanged  with respect  to Tables  6 and 7.
Finally,  in columns  9 and  10,  we exclude  institutional variables  and include  instead  a
full set  of country dummies.  The main  results remain unchanged,  except  for  the private
financing variable,  which is now  negative but not significant.
3.4  Relation to theoretical results
The empirical  results presented  above are broadly  consistent  with our theoretical  model.
We had first the prediction that better institutional quality  (both through our 0 variable,
representing  rule of law, non-corruption,  or the quality of the bureaucracy)  should imply
less renegotiations.  This is indeed the case as the coefficients  of the institutional variables
are generally negative and significant.
Political cycles have a positive effect,  in that post-election  years witness more renego-
tiations.  This result  can be related  to the  effect  of the degree  of state capture 'y. Under
this approach,  it means that,  as governments  closer to the firms access to power,  they are
likely to tolerate more renegotiations.
As anticipated,  shocks have the expected  effect  and are significant determinants  of the
probability  of renegotiation.
Relating  the  existence  of arbitration  rules  to  the  cost  of bargaining,  the  empirical
results are consistent with our model,  in that these  rules increase the occurrence  of rene-
gotiation.
The prediction with respect to investment,  which for some values of the parameters we
expected to have a positive effect on the probability of renegotiation,  is broadly confirmed
by the probit  analysis.  For private financing,  the model  yielded  ambiguous  predictions
due  to the moral  hazard  effect  through  the  impact  on the relative  bargaining  power  of
the  contracting  parties.  The empirical  results show  that the  dominant  effect  is positive
for  firm-led  renegotiations.  As  discussed  above,  the results  on these  two variables,  and
especially on the private financing one appear to be the main differences between firm- and
government-led  renegotiations.  The effect  of private financing  is  also relatively  unstable
when  marginally  modifying  the  sample  or  the  dependent  variable.  We  leave  a  more
complete analysis of this issue  for a future paper.
31Finally,  for the other variables  not modeled explicitly,  as anticipated,  we get negative
effects  for the existence  of a regulator,  while income  guarantees  and price cap regulation
have positive  effects.
4  Conclusion:  Policy Implications
We now discuss  in some more  details  the principal  results,  in  particular  with regards  to
their practical policy implications.
Regulatory  environment,  experience  and contracts' incompleteness.
The first  feature of the environment  having  an impact on  the probability of renegoti-
ation  is the existence of a regulatory body at the time the concession  was awarded.  This
aspect  significantly  reduces  the occurrence  of subsequent  renegotiations,  as  can be  seen
from  the  random  probit  panel.  The  effect  remains  unaltered  when  controlling  for  the
whole range  of characteristics,  shocks,  as well  as with sector and country  dummies  with
some slight exceptions  in Tables  7 and  8.
The pre-existence  of a regulator in the field  where a concession is awarded  can first be
related to the simple fact that a better designed regulation  from the start will reduce the
scope for obvious mistakes  and lessen the need  for later disruptive modifications.  Instead,
it  can  be  expected  that  contingencies  occurring  during  the life  of the  project  could  be
dealt  with  through  a normal  revision  process  inside  the  existing  regulatory  framework.
Furthermore the pre-existence of a regulator increases the quality of enforcement  by better
commitment.
Moreover,  this  aspect  can be  related to the  deeper  issue of contract  incompleteness.
It is sometimes argued  that concession  contracts should be made as  complete  as possible,
i.e.  trying to include every  possible  contingency  to avoid  leaving  room for  ex post  rene-
gotiations3'.  However,  there  are limits to this  approach.  First, in  a very  complex world
describing  infinite contingencies  might  prove  impossible,  and so  contracts  are bound  to
be incomplete.  Second,  imperfect  enforcement  limits the effectiveness  of these contracts.
Finally, complex  contracts might be counter-productive  if they lack transparency,  contain
contradictory  requirements  and lend  themselves  to opportunistic  revision  claims.  These
problems  favor  an  alternative  approach  which  relies  on  short  concession-specific  docu-
ments, while general rules regarding  concessions would  be found  in laws and the relevant
jurisprudence.  With this type of contract,  previous  experience  in dealing with the design
of concessions should have  an  important  role in limiting the risk of later renegotiations,
and this is precisely what we should expect from a specialized  and experienced  regulator.
31See the example of the Buenos Aires water concession,  running hundreds of pages and several volumes,
mentioned  in Klein  (1998).
32Type of regulation
The impact of the different regulatory  schemes on the probability  of renegotiation can
be observed  through  the price  cap  variable,  which  shows  up  positive  and  significant  in
almost all the specifications  tested.  This effect  remains when instrumenting  this variable
to try to take into  account the  self-selection problem.  Thus, price  cap  schemes  are  con-
ducive to more renegotiations  and this effect  is likely to be due to their greater  riskiness
and  fragility  to  shocks.  It  could  also  be  due  to  the  difficulties  of initiating  price  cap
regulation.
This  is  important,  since  75%  of the  concessions  in  Latin  America  are  regulated  by
price  caps,  and  the  region  is  characterized  by  a rather  volatile  economic  environment.
This  result  is  also  important  to point  out the  need to  take  into  account  this  weakness
of price cap regulation  when dealing  with  developing  countries.  Moreover,  remedies  like
minimum income guarantee clauses  seem to be ineffective  in taming the impact  of risk.
Shocks,  investment,  financing,  and specific  clauses.
If,  on top of basic  performance  requirements  (service  and  quality)  and price regula-
tion,  concession  contracts include  investment requirements,  they  may end up being  more
sensitive  to  fluctuations  in firm's  productivity,  shocks  and  overestimated  demand  fore-
casts  32.  The  positive  effect  of  the  investment  variable  in  table  6  to  8  is  thus  not  a
surprise.  However,  investment is generally  not a choice variable,  and,  as  discussed  in the
introduction,  concessions are likely to be awarded  precisely because the state is unable or
unwilling to assume important infrastructure  investments.  This points out to the effect  of
related  variables,  which  should compensate  for this increased  fragility:  private financing
and minimum  income guarantee.
Exclusive private financing proves to increase  significantly the occurrence  of renegoti-
ation.  Our results, both from standard and two stage  regressions,  point out to a negative
incentive  effect  of the financial structure on the behavior  of concessions'  holders.
Minimum  income  guarantees  do  in  principle  protect  holders  of concession  contract
against shocks and other unforeseen  contingencies.  However,  the empirical  analysis  does
not support this conclusion,  and leads to think that such guarantees  instead increase  the
probability  of renegotiation  by reducing  incentives to behave  efficiently  and/or fostering
strategic  underbidding,  as  well  as  by  making  possible  the  realization  of projects  with
negative  social  value.
32In  the transport  sector,  Engel  et  al.  (2001)  mention  demand  forecasts  for  the Washington  D.C.
Dulles  Airport-Leesburg,  Va.  toll road,  which were  overestimated  more than fourfold  by two  consulting
companies.  Argentine's freight railways concession included investment requirements that prove excessive
in view of the ulterior market development  (Klein,  1998).  Chilean tolled roads experienced  huge demand
fluctuations during the 1986-1995 period  (Engel et al.,  2000).
33Politics
Political  cycles  are likely  to  have  consequences  on  the occurrence  of renegotiations.
As our theoretical  model suggests,  the  government's  willingness  to accept  renegotiation
of concessions contracts  might  depend crucially  on the  extent to  which its  interests  are
aligned  with  those  of  the  firm.  Our  empirical  analysis  shows  that  in  years  following
national  elections,  the probability of renegotiation  increases  significantly,  even after  con-
trolling  for  the  economic  cycle.  This is  a  first  indication  of the  importance  of political
considerations.
A more  detailed analysis of this aspect  would need to consider the nature  of political
changes.  In  particular,  asymmetries  might appear  depending  on  whether  the previous
government  cares  more  or  less  for  the  rents  of the  firm  than  its  successor33. Finally,
interactions  between the  nature of government  and institutional  characteristics  like cor-
ruption might  also  be  relevant.  However,  we  can  expect  the  political  cycle  to be  even
more important when dealing with government led renegotiations.
33See Aubert and  Laffont  (2002).
34Appenidix  1
List of variables.
For all  dummy variables,  1=Yes,  O=No.
Renegotiation (resp.  initiated by the firm/by the Government): Dummy variable indi-
cating whether there was or not a renegotiation  of the concession  contract.
Existence of regulatory body:  Dummy variable  indicating whether  there was  or not  a
regulatory  body at the time of the concession  first coming into operation.
Price cap:  Dummy variable indicating  whether  the tariff regulation imposed  by the
regulator  is a price cap.
Investment requzrements: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or not invest-
ment requirements  as part of the concession contract.
Duration  since award: Indicates the number of year a concession  has been in operation
since its award.
Prvate  financzng: Dummy variable  indicating whether  the project  is funded  entirely
through  private  funds  (without  any financial  investment  of the state,  whether  local  or
national)  or not.
Biddzng process: Dummy variable indicating  whether there was  or not a bidding pro-
cess to award the concession.
Minzmum  income guarantee: Dummy variable  indicating  whether  there  is  or  not  a
government  guarantee  in term of minimum  income promissories.
Arbitration process: Dummy variable  indicating  whether  there  is or not a  formal set
of arbitration  processes stated  in the contract  providing  for the settlement  of  a dispute
between the concession  holder and the government,  should such a situation  arise.
Duratzon of contract: Duration,  in years,  for which the concession  is signed  for.
Corruption/Rule of law/Bureaucratbc quality: Indices  from  Political  risk  service,  In-
ternational  Country  Risk Guide;  annual values from  1989  to 1995,  and  1998 value  after.
Higher  value means  less corrupt/better  rule of law/better bureaucratic  quality.
Growth:  Yearly growth  rate of GDP in real  terms.  Source:  World  Bank and  Inter-
American  Development  Bank.
Exchange rate: Annual  evolution of the real exchange  rate (calculated  as rate of year
t - rate of year t-1/rate  of year t).  A positive value indicates  devaluation.  Source:  Inter-
American  Development  Bank.
35Election:  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  there  were  or  not  national  elections
(legislative or presidential) in any given year.  Source:  Political Database of the Americas.
Georgetown  University/Organization  of  American  States.  Center  for  Latin  American
Studies.
36Appendix  2
Reduced  form equation
Dependent  Renegotiations
variable  j initiated by firms
Existence  of  -1.29*
regulatory  body  (-6.25)




Election - 1  0.30***
(1.67)
GDP growth - 1  - 0.07*
(-3.55)
GDP growth-  2  - 0.14*
(-6.17)
Transport  sector  1.25*
dummy  (4.97)
Number of obs.  1267
Log likelihood  -143.59
37Appendix  3
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Price cap  Pnvate  Arbitration  Minimum  Bidding  Duration of
Dependent  regulation  financing  process  income  process  contract
Vanable  guarantee
Estimation  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  OLS
method
Water sector  -0.58  -2.34*  -3.58*  -1.43*  2.36*  10.12*
(-1.29)  (-7.23)  (-8.43)  (-3.35)  (2.93)  (7.19)
Existence of  -0.48  -1.68*  -1.01'*  0.52***  2.90*  13.10*
regulatory body  (-0.94)  (-5.06)  (-2.98)  (1.75)  (3.03)  (8.85)
Corruption  0.49*  -0.52*  -0.47**  -0.09  1.29*  3.50*
(2.66)  (-2.94)  (-2.37)  (-0.60)  (5.11)  (4.21)
Bureaucracy  -1.07*  0.85*  1.52*  -0.22  -1.73*  0.67
quality  (-4.16)  (4.88)  (5.37)  (-1.39)  (-4.80)  (0.83)
Rule of law  0.68*  0.08  0.16  0.11  1.91*  2.31*
(3.84)  (0.71)  (1.12)  (1.05)  (5.87)  4.20
Numbcr of obs.  307  262  296  305  307  303
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.31  0.28  0.53  0.16  0.63  10.22
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